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Abstract
This paper investigates a secure wireless-powered multiantenna multicasting system, where multiple power
beacons (PBs) supply power to a transmitter in order to establish a reliable communication link with multiple
legitimate users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. The transmitter has to harvest radio frequency (RF)
energy from multiple PBs due to the shortage of embedded power supply before establishing its secure communi-
cation. We consider two different scenarios. In the first, the PBs and the transmitter belong to the same operator,
where we formulate the resource allocation problem as the minimization of the total transmit power subject to
the target secure rate constraint. The solution of this problem yields both the optimal power and energy transfer
time allocation. Due to the non-convexity of this problem, we propose a two-level approach, where the inner level
problem can be recast as a convex optimization framework via conic convex reformulation, while the outer level
problem can be handled by using one-dimensional (1D) search. The second scenario considers the case where the
transmitter and the PBs belong to different service suppliers. Hence, we formulate the resource allocation problem
where we consider incentives for the PBs to assist the transmitter. This leads to the formulation of a Stackelberg
game for the secure wireless-powered multiantenna multicasting system. The transmitter has to pay for the energy
services from these multiple PBs in order to facilitate secure communications. In this game, the transmitter and
the PB are modelled as leader and follower, respectively, in which both of them try to maximize their own utility
function. The closed-form Stackelberg equilibrium of the formulated game is then derived. Finally, numerical results
are provided to validate our proposed schemes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless multicast media streaming is anticipated to be a significant component of the forthcoming
5G systems, motivated by the consumers’ desire to take advantage of high quality multimedia wireless
devices (e.g., 4k hand-held devices, 3D augmented reality) [1]–[3]. Energy efficiency and security are
major critical issues that must be addressed in the design of such systems.
Radio frequency (RF) energy harvesting and transfer techniques have recently been considered as a
promising solution to the energy-constrained wireless networks [4]–[6]. As a recent application of RF
energy harvesting and transfer techniques, wireless powered communication networks (WPCNs) have
become a novel technology in wireless networking and attracted more and more attention [7]. A “harvest-
then-transmit” protocol was proposed for WPCNs in [8], where the wireless users harvest power from the
RF signals broadcast by an access point in the downlink (DL), and then send information to the AP in
the uplink (UL) by employing the harvested energy. Cooperative protocols for WPCNs were developed
based on different models [9]–[11]. A different approach consists of deploying a dedicated wireless energy
transfer (WET) network with multiple power beacons (PBs) to provide wireless charging services to the
wireless terminals via the RF energy transfer technique [12], [13]. Since the PBs do not require any
backhaul link, the associated cost of PBs deployment is much lower, hence, it is feasible to deploy the
PBs densely to guarantee network coverage for a wide range of mobile devices [14].
Security in data transmission can be addressed either by traditional crypto methods, or more fun-
damentally, in terms of information theoretic secure rates. The latter approach, commonly referred to
as “physical-layer security,” was initially developed for the wiretap channel [15], [16], i.e., a broadcast
channel with one transmitter and two sets of receivers: legitimate users and eavesdroppers. Multiantenna
wiretap channels have been widely investigated in terms of secure rate region [17]–[21]. Some state-of-art
techniques, such as artificial noise (AN) and cooperative jammer (CJ), have been designed for multiantenna
transceivers, in order to introduce more interference at the eavesdroppers [22]–[27]. In [22], rank-one
solution properties were exploited with semidefinite programming (SDP) relaxation for secure transmit
beamforming. AN-assisted transmit optimization has been presented in [23], where the spatially selective
AN embedded with secure transmit beamforming was designed to obtain the optimal power allocation.
In [24], CJ from an external node is exploited in order to create interference at the eavesdroppers and
achieve the desired target secure rate. However, it is not always possible to have an own CJ to improve
the secrecy rates. Another option could be to employ a private CJ by paying a price for the jamming
services. This strategy was investigated in [24], [25], where a CJ releases its jamming service depending
interference caused to the eavesdropper, while the transmitter pays a certain amount to guarantee its
secure communication. In this strategy, a Stackelberg game can be formulated to obtain the optimal power
allocation. In addition, cooperative cognitive radio (CR) combined with secure communications could
also be modelled as a Stackelberg game to determine the optimal resource allocations [28]. In [26], [27],
the secrecy rate optimization problem was posed in terms of outage secrecy rates, due to the fact that
the channels are not perfectly known and are subject to random fading with known statistics. Physical-
layer security techniques have also been recently developed in radio frequency identification (RFID). The
design of RFID systems is a challenge due to the broadcast nature of backscatter communication, which
is vulnerable to eavesdropping [29]. Simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) has
emerged as one of most promising approaches to provide power for communication devices. SWIPT has
been considered in combination with physical-layer security in a number of recent works (e.g., [30]–[33]).
It is worth pointing out that the transmit power is constant in the above secure communication systems.
However, the use of WET effectively makes the available transmit power a system variable in order to
achieve secure communications. Thus, this research gap motivates the work in this paper.
We investigate a WPCN-assisted multiantenna secure multicasting system in which a multicast service
provider (i.e., the transmitter) guarantees secure communication with legitimate users in the presence of
multiple eavesdroppers by utilizing the harvested energy from the PBs. In particular, we consider two
different but complementary scenarios. In the first scenario, the transmitter and the PBs are considered
to belong to the same service provider. In the second, they belong to different service providers with
different objectives. Accordingly, we formulate and solve the two different problems as follows:
1) Power minimization for WPCN-aided multiantenna secure multicasting system: This problem is
formulated for the first scenario, where there is no energy trading between the transmitter and the
PBs. They cooperate to minimize the transmit power for a given target secure multicast rate. The
optimization problem is not jointly convex in terms of PBs’ transmit power, the fraction of time
dedicated to WET, and the transmit beamforming vector. To circumvent this non-convexity issue,
we consider a two-level approach. The outer level can be recast as a single-variable optimization
problem with respect to the energy time allocation, in which the optimal solution can be achieved via
numerical search, while the inner level remains a non-convex power minimization problem. There
are different approaches for the inner level problem. In [22], semidefinite programming (SDP)
relaxation was employed to solve the power minimization for the case of single legitimate user
only. However, this approach will not guarantee a rank-1 solution when extending to the case of
multiple users. Therefore, a rank-1 feasible solution for the original beamforming problem must
be obtained from the solution of the relaxed problem, with no optimality guarantee (see, e.g.,
[34], [35]) Differently, we first propose a novel reformulation based on matrix transformations and
convex conic optimization techniques, yielding a second-order cone programming (SOCP) solution
which is optimal when the SDP relaxed solution satisfies the rank-one condition. Then, we propose
a successive convex approximation (SCA) based SOCP scheme, which is performed iteratively to
obtain the optimal transmit beamformer directly for any general case. Numerical results confirm that
our proposed SCA based SOCP scheme outperforms the SDP relaxed scheme, and the proposed
SOCP scheme has more computationally efficient than the SDP relaxed scheme that uses Guided
Randomization method.
2) Game theory based WPCN-aided multiantenna secure multicasting system: In this problem, we
investigate the case where the transmitter and the PBs belong to different service operators, both of
which want to maximize their own benefit. Thus, an energy price must be paid by the transmitter in
order to induce the PBs to provide enough WET to guarantee secure communications. In particular,
we develop an energy trading framework for wireless powered secure multiantenna multicasting
systems, where the strategic behavior of the transmitter and the PBs is modeled as a Stackelberg
game. The transmitter acts a leader that buys energy from the PBs to achieve a desired secure
multicast rate to the users. The transmitter optimizes the energy price and energy transfer time to
maximize its utility function, defined as the weighted difference between revenues (proportional
to the achieved secure rate) and costs of the purchased energy. The PBs are the followers, that
determine their optimal transmit powers based on the energy price released from the transmitter
to maximize their own profits, defined as the difference between the payment received from the
transmitter and its energy cost. We obtain a closed-form solution for the Stackelberg equilibrium, in
which both the PBs and the transmitter come to an agreement on the energy price, transmit power
and energy time allocation.
Related works: Considering the first scenario, unlike [28] where an intermediate self-sustainable relay
was employed to enable cooperation between a WET network and a wireless information transfer (WIT)
network to guarantee secure communications subject to outage probability constraints, our work is to
exploit direct energy interactions between the multicasting service provider and the PBs to facilitate
secure communications of the legitimate users. Moreover, we also consider a special case with a single
legitimate user and a single eavesdropper. In [36], the authors aimed to maximize the secrecy rate subject
to the transmit power budget, and the optimal beamforming vector was designed based on Rayleigh
quotient approach; whereas our work for this special case presents the closed-form solution of the joint
design of the optimal time allocation and the optimal transmit beamforming vector to achieve the target
of minimizing the transmitter’s transmit power, via the dual problem and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
condition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents our system model. Section III solves
the power minimization problem for the secure WPCN multiantenna multicasting system, whereas the
game theory based secure WPCN multiantenna multicasting system is investigated in Section IV. Section
V provides simulation results to validate the theoretical derivations. Finally, Section VI concludes the
paper.
A. Notations
We use the upper case boldface letters for matrices and lower case boldface letters for vectors. (·)T
and (·)H denote the transpose and conjugate transpose respectively. Tr(·) and E{·} stand for trace of a
matrix and the statistical expectation for random variables. ̺max(∗) represents the maximum eigenvalue,
whereas vmax(∗) denotes the eigenvector associated with the maximum eigenvalue. A  0 indicates that
A is a positive semidefinite matrix. ‖ ∗ ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm of a vector. I and (·)−1 denote the
identity matrix with appropriate size and the inverse of a matrix respectively. [x]+ represents max{x, 0}.
The notation Kn denotes the following generalized inequality:
 a
b

 Kn 0⇔ ‖b‖ ≤ a,
where b ∈ Cn−1 and Kn ⊆ Rn is called a proper cone.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we consider the secure wireless powered multiantenna multicasting system as shown
in Fig. 1, where a transmitter broadcasts the same information to all legitimate users in the presence
of multiple eavesdroppers. Due to energy limitation at the transmitter, it is assumed that there is not
enough power supply for information transfer, and thus the transmitter must harvest energy from the PBs.
This system consists M single antenna PBs, one multiantenna transmitter equipped with NT transmit
antennas, K single antenna legitimate users and L single antenna eavesdroppers. This secrecy model has
some potential applications, such as on-demand video broadcasting, wireless sensor networks and device
to device (D2D) communication systems. In our paper, a harvest-then-transmit protocol is considered.
Specifically, time is divided in periods of duration T . Each period is split into a WET phase of duration
θT, and a WIT phase of duration (1−θ)T, where θ ∈ (0, 1) is a system parameter that must be optimized.
Let hs,k ∈ CNT×1 denote the channel coefficients between the transmitter and the k-th legitimate user,
while he,l ∈ CNT×1 denotes the channel coefficients between the transmitter and the l-th eavesdropper.
Also, gm ∈ C1×NT denotes the channel coefficients between the m-th PB and the transmitter. First, each
Fig. 1: WPCN for multiantenna secure multicasting system.
PB transfers the energy to the transmitter, the harvested energy during the WET phase of θT at the
transmitter can be written as
EB = ξ
M∑
m=1
pm‖gm‖2θT, (1)
where pm denotes the transmit power of the m-th PB, and 0 < ξ ≤ 1 is the efficiency for converting the
harvested energy to the electrical energy to be stored, which is assumed to be ξ = 1 in this paper. During
the WIT phase of (1 − θ)T , the received signal at the k-th legitimate user and the l-th eavesdropper are
given by
ys,k =
√
EB
(1− θ)T h
H
s,kvs+ ns,k, k = 1, ..., K,
ye,l =
√
EB
(1− θ)T h
H
e,lvs+ ne,l, l = 1, ..., L,
where s denotes the Gaussian distributed transmit signal with unit norm, v ∈ CNT×1 is the normalized
transmit beamformer with E{‖v‖2} = 1, ns,k and ne,l are additive white Gaussian noises (AWGNs) at
the k-th legitimate user and the l-th eavesdropper with variance σ2s and σ
2
e . Hence, the channel capacity
of the k-th legitimate user and the l-th eavesdropper can be expressed as [37]
Rs,k = (1− θ) log
(
1 +
θ
∑M
m=1 pm‖gm‖2|hHs,kv|2
(1− θ)σ2s
)
, ∀k, (2)
and
Re,l = (1− θ) log
(
1 +
θ
∑M
m=1 pm‖gm‖2|hHe,lv|2
(1− θ)σ2e
)
, ∀l, (3)
respectively. For this secure multicasting system, we have the following definition:
Definition 1: Multicast secrecy rate of a multicasting system with K users is defined as [35]
RK = min
k∈[1,K]
[Rs,k − max
l∈[1,L]
Re,l]
+. (4)
In the following, we develop two resource allocation schemes depending on whether the transmitter and
the PBs belong to the same service supplier.
III. POWER MINIMIZATION FOR WPCN MULTIANTENNA SECURE MULTICASTING SYSTEM
In this section, we consider the scenario that the transmitter and the PBs belong to the same service
provider in a multicasting network. We will formulate a power minimization problem where the total
transmit power at the transmitter is minimized to satisfy the target secrecy rate for all the legitimate users
in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers by using the harvested energy from the PBs. We assume that the
channel state information (CSI) between the transmitter and k-th user as well as l-th eavesdropper (i.e.,
hs,k, ∀k and he,l, ∀l) is available at the transmitter. This can be achieved through different methods such
as the local oscillator power leakage from the eavesdropper receivers’ RF frontend [38] or even the CSI
feedback method [39]. For example, in a video broadcasting system there may be legitimate users that are
entitled to receive the content and other users who have not subscribed to this content, but are still part
of the system. These users obey the basic physical-layer protocol rules, which includes feeding back CSI
to enable beamforming. Hence, in this case, it is practical to assume that the CSI of the eavesdroppers is
known at the transmitter.
A. Power Minimization
The minimization of the total transmit power1 subject to a given secure multicast rate constraint can
be written as:
min
pm,v,θ
∑M
m=1 pm‖gm‖2θ
(1− θ) ‖v‖
2,
s.t. RK ≥ R¯, 0 ≤ pm ≤ P, 0 < θ < 1, (5)
where P is the maximum power constraint at each PB, and R¯ denotes the target secure multicast rate.
The problem (5) is not convex in terms of v and θ, and cannot be solved directly. It is obvious that from
1The objective function in (5) consists of three variables: the transmit power of the PBs (i.e., pm, ∀m), energy transfer time allocation
(i.e., θ) and normalized transmit beamforming vector (i.e., v).
problem (5), the optimal solution of pm is pm = P, which is the maximum transmit power at each PB.
Thus, the problem (5) reduces to
min
w,θ
∑M
m=1 ‖gm‖2θ
(1− θ) ‖w‖
2,
s.t. RK(θ,w) ≥ R¯, 0 < θ < 1, (6)
where RK(θ,w) can be written as
RK(θ,w) = min
k∈[1,K]
(1− θ)
[
log
(
1 +
θ
∑M
m=1 ‖gm‖2|hHs,kw|2
(1− θ)σ2s
)
− max
l∈[1,L]
log
(
1 +
θ
∑M
m=1 ‖gm‖2|hHe,lw|2
(1− θ)σ2e
)]+
,
and w =
√
Pv.
Remark 1: Problem (6) may be infeasible, depending on the value of R¯ and on the channel vectors hs,k
and he,l. However, the feasibility can be ensured with probability of 1 for the case where the users’ and
eavesdroppers’ channels are drawn randomly and independently from a continuous distribution with full-
rank covariance matrix (e.g., a proper Gaussian non-degenerate NT -variate distribution) and the number
of antennas NT is not smaller than K + L (e.g., in the massive multiantenna systems)
2.
It can be observed that even when problem (6) is feasible, it still still nonconvex. In order to solve this
problem, we considered a two-level approach, where the inner level can be handled by employing the
convex conic reformulation for a given energy transfer time allocation factor θ, whereas the outer level
consists of a line search over the parameter θ in (0,1). Now, we rewrite the problem (6) into the following
two levels:
1) Inner level:
f(θ) = min
w
θ(
∑M
m=1 ‖gm‖2)
1− θ ‖w‖
2, s.t. RK(w) ≥ R¯, (7)
2) Outer level:
min
θ
f(θ), s.t. 0 < θ < 1. (8)
We first solve the inner problem (7) for a given θ, which can be equivalently modified as
min
w
‖w‖2
s.t. log
(
1 +
|hHs,kw|2
σ¯2s
)
− log
(
1 +
|hHe,lw|2
σ¯2e
)
≥ R¯, ∀ (k, l) (9)
2In this case, it is always possible to use zero-forcing beamforming to all eavesdroppers, such that for sufficiently large P any target
secrecy rate R¯ can be achieved. The condition of sufficient transmit power P can be guaranteed because of the fact that the PBs and the
transmitter belong to the same service provider and they can work together on an adaptive power transfer policy (i.e., P is adjusted according
to the required solution w such that P = ‖w‖2).
where σ¯2s =
(1−θ)σ2s
θ
∑M
m=1 ‖gm‖
2
, σ¯2e =
(1−θ)σ2e
θ
∑M
m=1 ‖gm‖
2
, and R¯ = R¯
1−θ
. The problem (9) is not convex in terms of
w, and still cannot be solved efficiently. In order to circumvent this non-convex issue, we can introduce
a new semi-definite matrix Qs = ww
H , and the problem (9) can be relaxed as
min
Qs0
Tr(Qs),
s.t.
1
σ2s
Tr(hs,kh
H
s,kQs)−
2R¯
σ2e
Tr(he,lh
H
e,lQs) ≥ 2R¯ − 1, ∀(k, l). (10)
The above problem is a convex optimization framework, which can be solved by using interior-point
methods [40]. It is not always possible to expect that the optimal solution of (10) attains the optimum
of the original problem (9). However, the SDP relaxation will be tight if the optimal solution of (10) is
of rank-one. Therefore, we characterize the rank property of the SDP relaxed solution via the following
proposition:
Proposition 1: [34, Theorem 1] Provided the problem (10) is feasible, the optimal solution of (10)
must satisfy the following rank inequality:
rank(Qs) ≤ min(K,
√
KL) (11)
With Proposition 1, we are able to identify the tightness of SDP relaxed solution via the following lemma
Lemma 1: [34, Corollary 1] Provided the problem (10) feasible, it is guaranteed that (10) can yield a
rank-one solution which exactly solves the problem (9) when either of the following conditions is satisfied:
1) K = 1 and L ≥ 1.
2) 1 < K ≤ 3, and L = 1.
By exploiting Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, if rank(Qs) satisfies the rank-one condition in Lemma 1, we
can employ the eigen-decomposition for Qs to obtain the optimal transmit beamformer w. Otherwise, we
need to use a rank reduction algorithm to tackle this problem [41]. However, when rank-one condition in
Lemma 1 is satisfied, we can also consider the following theorem to directly solve the problem (9).
Theorem 1: The problem (9) can be reformulated into the following convex optimization framework
when the rank-one condition in Lemma 1 is satisfied.
min
t≥0,w
t,
s.t.

 t
w

 K(NT+1) 0,


1
σ¯s
wHhs,k
2R¯
σ¯e
wHhe,l
(2R¯ − 1) 12

 K3 0, ∀ (k, l). (12)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.
By exploiting Theorem 1, it is easily verified that (12) is a convex optimization problem, which can be
solved by using interior-point methods [40]. Thus, the optimal transmit power of each PB can be adaptively
updated as P opt = ‖w‖2, and the optimal transmit beamforming vector vopt can also be easily achieved.
Now, we consider the computation complexity of solving problem (12). According to the analysis of
the basic complexity elements in [42], problem (12) includes one second-order cone (SOC) constraint
with dimension NT + 1, KL SOC constraints with dimension NT , and one linear constraint. Thus, its
computation complexity can be given by O
(√
2KL+ 3n[KLN2T + (NT + 1)
2 + 1 + n2]
)
ln(1
ǫ
), where
n = O(NT + 1), and ǫ > 0 denotes the accuracy requirement.
A special case: Consider the case with a single legitimate user and a single eavesdropper only. The closed-
form solution can be derived by exploiting Lagrange dual problem and KKT conditions. For notational
convenience, we replace the channel notations hs,k and he,l by hs and he, respectively. The following
lemma is introduced:
Lemma 2: The optimal solution to (7) with only single legitimate user and single eavesdropper is given
by
wopt =
√
P optvopt, vopt =
w¯
‖w¯‖2 , w¯ = vmax(
1
σ¯2s
hsh
H
s −
2R¯
σ¯2e
heh
H
e ),
P opt = αopt(2R¯ − 1), αopt = 1
̺max(
1
σ¯2s
hshHs − 2R¯σ¯2e hehHe )
. (13)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Now, it is natural that a question may arise with regard how to tackle with the problem (9) when the
rank-one condition in Lemma 1 is not satisfied. Hence, we consider a SCA based scheme to reformulate
the problem (9) for any general case, yielding an SOCP. We equivalently rewrite the problem (9) by
introducing a new set of variables (xs,k, ys,k, bs,k), ∀k as
min
w,bs,k
‖w‖2,
s.t. x2s,k + y
2
s,k ≥ bs,k, (14a)
(2R¯ − 1)σ2s +
2R¯σ2s
σ2e
|wHhe,l|2 ≤ bs,k, (14b)
xs,k = ℜ
{
wHhs,k
}
, ys,k = ℑ
{
wHhs,k
}
, (14c)
where (xs,k, ys,k, bs,k) ∈ R, ∀k In the above reformulation, it is observed that both constraint (14a) and
(14b) are still not convex while (14c) are linear constraints. In order to further process these non-convex
constraints, we first introduce iterative successive approximation methods to tackle with (14a). Specifically,
set qs,k = [xs,k ys,k]
T , and denote the value of this vector at the n-th iteration as q
(n)
s,k , we consider the
first-order Taylor series to approximate the left hand side of (14a) as
x2s,k + y
2
s,k = q
T
s,kqs,k ≈ ‖u(n)s,k‖2 + 2
2∑
i=1
u
(n)
s,k [qs,k(i)− u(n)s,k (i)], (15)
where the parameter vector u
(n)
s,k (i) can be updated u
(n+1)
s,k = q
(n)
s,k , ∀k at the (n + 1)-th iteration. From
this update, it is easily verified that u
(n)
s,k can be determined by q
(n−1)
s,k . Thus, (15) can be given by
‖u(n)s,k‖2 + 2
2∑
i=1
u
(n)
s,k [qs,k(i)− u(n)s,k (i)] ≥ bs,k. (16)
To proceed, the constraint (14b) can be equivalently reformulated into the following SOC
∥∥∥∥∥∥

 (2R¯ − 1) 12σs
2
R¯
2 σs
σe
wHhe,l


∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ bs,k ⇒
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥


(2R¯ − 1) 12σs
2
R¯
2 σs
σe
wHhe,l
(bs,k−1)
2


∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤ (bs,k + 1)
2
(17)
Remark 2: The convexity of the term qTs,kqs,k and the first-order Taylor approximation ensures that
the right hand side in (15) bounds the left side in each iterative procedure. In other words, the optimal
solution of the problem with the approximate constraint in (16) definitely belongs to the feasible set of
the original optimization problem at each iteration. Also, due to the above update, in the (n + 1) step,
the approximation in (16) holds with equality. In addition, the gradients of both sides with respect to
the optimization variables in (16) are also the same at the (n + 1)-th iteration, which can prove that the
solution of the iterative procedure satisfies the KKT conditions of the original problem (9). This fact has
been proved in [43].
By exploiting Remark 2, the problem (9) takes the following form at the n-th iteration
min
w,bs,k
‖w‖2,
s.t. (16), (17), (14c), ∀(k, l). (18)
Based on the above discussion, an iterative algorithm to approximately solve the problem in (9) is
summarized as in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Successive convex approximation to solve (9)
1) Initialization: Randomly generate u
(0)
s,k, ∀k to make (18) feasible
2) Repeat
a) Solve (18).
b) Set u
(n+1)
s,k = q
(n)
s,k , ∀k.
c) Set n := n+ 1.
3) Until required accuracy is achieved or the maximum number of iterations is reached.
From Algorithm 1, the initialized vector us,k is given by random generation to guarantee the feasibility
of (18), which can be updated at each iteration until u
(n+1)
s,k = q
(n)
s,k holds when the algorithm converges.
In addition, it is guaranteed that Algorithm 1 converges to a locally optimal solution (quite close to the
globally optimal solution) [44], [45].
Next, we focus on the outer level problem in (8). This is a single-variable optimization problem with
respect to θ, which is rewritten as follows:
min
θ
f(θ), s.t. 0 < θ < 1. (19)
We can show that f(θ) is a convex optimization problem with respect to θ via the following lemma:
Lemma 3: (19) is a convex problem with respect to θ.
Proof: See Appendix C.
By exploiting Lemma 3, the optimal energy transfer time allocation factor (i.e., θopt) can be obtained by
using one-dimensional (1D) single-variable search (e.g., golden search) in the interval θ ∈ [0, 1]. Then,
the optimal power allocation policy can be achieved.
IV. GAME THEORY BASED SECURE WPCN MULTIANTENNA MULTICASTING SYSTEM
In the previous section, we considered that the transmitter and the PBs belong to the same service
provider, in which they try to work together to achieve their common target. However, this is not always
the case so that, in this section, we consider the opposite scenario where the transmitter and the PBs
are from two different service providers. Both parties want to maximize their own benefit. To model this
scenario, we assume that the transmitter will have to pay for the energy services from the PBs, whereas
the PBs will consider this payment as incentives to provide wireless energy transfer service. Obviously,
being able to decide what price to pay for the energy service, the transmitter can take a leading role
in dictating the energy trading interaction. This fits very well the model of a Stackelberg game, which
motivates us to use this game theory to optimize both parties’ benefit. In this game model, the transmitter
(leader) first pays for the harvested energy with an energy price to maximize its utility function. Then,
the PBs (followers) optimize their transmit powers based on their released energy price to maximize their
individual utility function.
A. Stackelberg Game Formulation
Let λ denote the energy price that the transmitter will pay to the PBs. The total payment of the
transmitter to the M PBs, donoted by QM , is written as
QM = λθT
M∑
m=1
pm‖gm‖2, (20)
where pm denotes the transmit power of the mth PB. Without loss of generality, we can assume T = 1.
We now define the utility function of the transmitter as follows:
UM = µRK −QM , (21)
where µ > 0 is the weight per a unit of secrecy throughput, by which the transmitter uses to convert the
achievable secrecy rate RK into the equivalent revenue. Therefore, the leader game for the transmitter can
be formulated as
max
λ,θ,v
UM , s.t. 0 < θ < 1, λ ≥ 0. (22)
At the same time, each PB can be modelled as a follower that wants to maximize its own revenue function,
which is defined as follows:
UPB,m = θ(λpm‖gm‖2 − Fm(pm)), (23)
where Fm(pm) is used to model the cost of the m-th PB per unit time for wirelessly charging the
transmitter with the transmit power pm. In this paper, we consider the following quadratic model
1 for the
cost function of the PBs:
Fm(x) = Amx2 +Bmx (24)
where Am > 0 and Bm > 0 are the constants that can be different for each PB. Thus, the follower game
of m-th PB is given by
max
pm
UPB,m, s.t. pm ≥ 0. (25)
Both (22) and (25) form a Stackelberg game for this secure WPCN multiantenna multicasting system,
where the transmitter (leader) announces an energy price, and then the PBs (followers) optimize the
transmit power based on the released energy price to maximize their individual revenue functions. The
solution of this Stackelberg game can be obtained by investigating the Stackelberg equilibrium, where the
transmitter and the PBs come to an agreement on the energy price, the transmit power of each PB and
the time fraction of energy transfer duration. Note that the deviation of either the transmitter or the PBs
from the Stackelberg equilibrium will introduce a loss in their revenue functions.
B. Solution of The Proposed Stackelberg Game
In order to derive the solution of this game, the well-known Stackelberg equilibrium concept can be
defined as follows:
Definition 2: Let (θopt, λopt) denote the solutions of problem (22) while {poptm } represents the solution
of problem (25) (here, the brackets {} indicate a vector that include all pm’s with ∀m). Then, the triple-
1The quadratic model has been commonly used in the energy market to model the energy cost [46].
variable set (θopt, λopt, poptm ) is a Stackelberg equilibrium of the formulated game provided that the following
conditions are satisfied
UM(θ
opt, λopt, {poptm }) ≥ UM (θ, λ, {poptm }), (26)
UPB,m(θ
opt, λopt, poptm ) ≥ UPB,m(θopt, λopt, pm), ∀m. (27)
for 0 < θ < 1, λ ≥ 0, and pm ≥ 0, ∀m.
First, it can be observed that problem (25) is convex with respect with pm for given values of λ and θ.
Thus, the optimal solution is obtained as in the following theorem:
Theorem 2: For given λ and θ, the optimal solution to (25) is given by
poptm =


λ‖gm‖2−Bm
2Am
, λ > Bm
‖gm‖2
0, λ ≤ Bm
‖gm‖2
.
(28)
Proof: The proof of this theorem is achieved by equating the first derivative of (23) to zero.
From Theorem 2, we can deduce the following remark:
Remark 3: The optimal power allocation poptm can only be obtained under the condition that the energy
price λ is greater than threshold Bm
‖gm‖2
. Thus, we divide the PBs into two sets, namely, the active and
non-active PBs. The PBs who can transfer the power to the transmitter and help determine the achievable
secrecy rate by using the harvested energy are called active PBs. The remaining ones are non-active
PBs. Generally, according to (28), we can determine these active PBs and re-index them for the total
power computation. In our paper, for convenience, we assume that all PBs are active and considered to
be involved in the WET phase of θT.
By exploiting Theorem 2 and Remark 3, we replace pm in (22) with (28), problem (22) now becomes
max
λ,θ
µ(1− θ)
[
log
[
1 +
(
λ
M∑
m=1
‖gm‖4
2Am
−
M∑
m=1
Bm‖gm‖2
2Am
)
ts
]
− log
[
1 +
(
λ
M∑
m=1
‖gm‖4
2Am
−
M∑
m=1
Bm‖gm‖2
2Am
)
te
]]
− θλ2
M∑
m=1
‖gm‖4
2Am
+ θλ
M∑
m=1
Bm‖gm‖2
2Am
s.t. 0 < θ < 1, λ ≥ 0 (29)
where
ts = min
k
ts,k = min
k
θ|hHs,kv|2
(1− θ)σ2s
, ∀k, te = max
l
te,l = min
l
θ|hHe,lv|2
(1− θ)σ2e
, ∀l.
Note that before solving problem (29), the normalized transmit beamfoming vector v can be obtained
by employing a similar approach as in Section III Thus, we solve for the optimal solution to the energy
price λ and the energy transfer time allocation θ only in leader level game (29). The problem (29) is not
jointly convex in terms of θ and λ. It is extremely hard to find their optimal solutions simultaneously
due to the complexity of the objective function in (29). In order to address this issue, we first derive the
closed-form solution for the optimal λ with a given value θ. Then, the optimal value for θ can be achieved
through numerical analysis. In order to derive the closed-form solution of λ, we set CM =
∑M
m=1
‖gm‖4
2Am
,
DM =
∑M
m=1
Bm‖gm‖2
4Am
, and the objective function to (29) can be expressed as
UM (θ, λ) = µ(1− θ)
[
log
[
1 +
(
λCM − 2DM
)
ts
]
− log
[
1 +
(
λCM − 2DM
)
te
]]
− θλ2CM + 2θλDM . (30)
Lemma 4: (30) is a concave function with respect to λ.
Proof: See Appendix D.
By exploiting Lemma 4, we can claim that (29) is a convex problem. Now, we derive the closed-form
solution of λ. In order to obtain the optimal solution to λ, let the first order derivative of (30) equate to
zero, we have
µ(1− θ)tsCM
1 + (λCM −DM)ts −DM ts −
µ(1− θ)teCM
1 + (λCM −DM)te −DM te − 2θCMλ+ 2θDM = 0. (31)
Set x = λCM −DM , and after a few of mathematical simplifications, we arrive at
x3 + ax2 + bx+ c = 0, (32)
where
a =
(ts + te)− 2DMtste
tste
, b =
(DM ts − 1)(DM te − 1)
tste
, c = −µ(1− θ)CM(ts − te).
It is easily observed that (32) is a cubic equation, which can be solved in terms of closed-form solution
of x by using Cardano’s formula [47],
xopt = ej∠x1 3
√
|x1|+ ej∠x2 3
√
|x2| − a/3, (33)
where ∠ denotes the phase angle of an complex random variable, and
x1 = −q
2
+
√
∆, x2 = −q
2
−
√
∆,
∆ =
p3
27
+
q2
4
, p = −a
2
3
+ b, q =
2a3
27
− ab
3
+ c.
Thus, we obtain the optimal energy price as
λopt =
xopt +DM
CM
. (34)
We have already obtained the optimal energy price of the transmitter for a given θ. Now, the optimal
energy transfer time allocation is derived in the following. We substitute the closed-form expression (34)
into (30), thus, the following optimization problem can be written with respect to θ,
max
θ
UM (θ, λ
opt), s.t. 0 < θ < 1. (35)
The problem (35) can be efficiently handled by using 1D search to obtain the optimal energy transfer
time solution θopt as follows:
θopt = arg max
θ∈(0,1)
UM(θ, λ
opt). (36)
We have completed the derivation of the Stackelberg equilibrium (poptm , λ
opt, θopt) for the formulated
Stackelberg game, which are shown in (28), (33) and (36).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide the simulation results to validate the proposed schemes. We consider the
secure multiantenna multicasting system that consists of three legitimate receivers (i.e., K = 3) and two
eavesdroppers (L = 5), where the transmitter is wirelessly powered by five PBs (M = 5). It is assumed
that the transmitter is equipped with eight transmit antennas (i.e., NT = 8), whereas the others consist of
single antenna. We employ the path loss channel model
√
Ad−αx , where A = 10
−3. The path loss exponent
is set to α = 3. Distance variable dx can be replaced with ds, de, and dPB according to different channel
coefficients, representing the distance between the transmitter and the legitimate users, the eavesdroppers
as well as the PBs, respectively. In our simulation, we choose ds = de = 2 m, and dPB = 5 m unless
specified. The target secrecy rate is set to be R¯ = 2 bps/Hz. The noise powers at the legitimate users and
the eavesdroppers are set as σ2s = σ
2
e = 10
−8 mW.
First, we evaluate the minimized transmit power obtained from our proposed scheme in Section III
against the distance between PBs and the transmitter (i.e., dPB). Fig. 2 shows the result with general
case when the rank-one condition in Lemma 1 is not satisfied. From this result, one can observe that our
proposed SCA scheme outperforms the SDP scheme in [35]. This is owing to a fact that our proposed
scheme can achieve a optimal solution via Algorithm 1, whereas the SDP scheme cannot satisfy the
rank-one condition such that the relaxed solution cannot achieve optimality. Fig. 3 evaluates the results
of Theorem 1, where it is observed that the SOCP yields the same performance with the proposed SCA
scheme and SDP scheme, which confirms that the correctness and accuracy of Theorem 1. Fig. 4 shows
the impact of the energy time allocation. From this figure, we observe that the proposed SOCP scheme
with the fixed time allocation based scheme (i.e., θ = 0.5) that obviously requires more transmit power
than the proposed SOCP scheme with optimal energy time allocation, this is owing to a fact that our
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Fig. 2: Comparison of transmit power between the proposed scheme and SDP scheme versus distance between PBs and
transmitter.
proposed scheme can achieve a optimal energy time allocation by numerical search (i.e., θ = θopt).
Similar behaviours are observed in Fig. 5 which is obtained for the special case of single user and single
eavesdropper. This figure shows that the derived closed-form solution in Lemma 2 matches well with the
numerical results obtained from a convex optimization tool, which validates the accuracy of this closed-
form solution. In Fig. 6, we compare the run time of our proposed scheme and the SDP relaxation with
Guided Randomzation3 [48] versus the number of transmit antenna NT . From this result, one can observe
that our proposed scheme consume less time than SDP with Guided Randomization, which implies that
proposed algorithm has a lower computational complexity.
Next, we validate the equilibrium of the proposed Stackelberg game. In order to support the derived
Stackelberg equilibrium, we first evaluate the utility function of the transmitter versus the energy transfer
price λ with a fixed energy transfer time allocation θ in Fig. 7. From this figure, it is observed that the
revenue function is concave, which validates the proof of convexity shown in Lemma 4. In this figure, it
also can be shown that the optimal utility function of the transmitter can be obtained via optimal energy
transfer price λopt in (34) and it matches the numerical search with different given θ, which confirms the
3Guided Randomization is employed to tackle with the scenario that the SDP relaxed solution is not rank-one.
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
Distance between PBs and transmitter d PB  (m)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Tr
an
sm
it 
po
we
r (
W
)
Proposed scheme (K = 1, L = 5, M = 3)
SDP scheme (K = 1, L = 5, M = 3)
SOCP schem (K = 1, L = 5, M =3)
Proposed scheme (K = 1, L = 5, M = 5)
SDP scheme (K = 1, L = 5, M = 5)
SOCP scheme (K = 1, L = 5, M = 5)
Fig. 3: Comparison of transmit power between the SOCP and SDP schemes versus distance between PBs and transmitter.
optimal closed-form solution of the energy transfer price λ. Also, as θ increases, the utility function of
the legitimate transmitter is decreasing, and the optimal value λ shifts to the left.In addition, the revenue
function of the transmitter versus energy transfer time allocation (i.e., θ) with optimal energy price λopt
is shown in Fig. 8. From this figure, it is shown that the revenue function is concave with respect to θ,
which validates (36). Moreover, there exists a optimal utility transfer time (i.e., θopt) via numerical search
with the optimal energy price. As µ increases, the optimal value slightly shifts to the left.
Then, we evaluate the transmitter revenue function performance of the proposed Stackelberg game.
Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 show the revenue function of the transmitter versus the number of PBs. From both
figures, we can observe that this utility is improved with increasing of the number of PBs and µ. From
Fig. 9, increasing the number of the eavesdroppers can have more significant impact on the revenue than
increasing the number of the legitimate users. In Fig. 10, the revenue is decreased when the distance
between the source and PBs is increased from 5m to 6.5m. This is because the nearer the PBs to the
transmitter, the higher the transferred energy efficiency between them, which reduces the transmitter’s
payments to the PBs for their wireless energy services. Fig. 11 shows the optimal energy transfer time θ
versus the number of PBs. It is observed that θ decreases as either the number of the PBs or µ increase.
The same behavior is observed when the distance between the source and PBs (i.e., dPB) decreases. Fig.
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Fig. 4: Comparison of transmit power between the proposed scheme with optimal θ and fixed θ versus distance between PBs
and transmitter.
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Fig. 11: Optimal energy transfer time allocation θ versus No. of PBs
12 shows the optimal energy price versus the number of PBs. The price decreases as the number of PBs
increases. Besides, the larger µ, the higher optimal energy price needs to be paid. It can also be seen
from this figure that the decrease of the distance between the transmitter and PBs can also reduce the
optimal energy price. This is because the shorter the distance between the source and PBs, the more
energy harvested by the transmitter for the same power transmitted by the PBs, such that a lower energy
price can be paid by the transmitter.
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Fig. 12: The optimal energy price versus No. of PBs.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we investigated the secure wireless-powered multiantenna multicasting system, which
consists of a dedicated wireless powered networks with multiple PBs and a multiantenna secure multi-
casting system. We first investigated the power minimization problem to obtain the optimal power and
energy transfer time allocation when both wireless power and secure information networks belong to the
same service supplier. As this problem is not convex, we proposed a two-level approach, where the inner
level problem can be relaxed as a convex optimization framework via iterative conic convex reformulation
(i.e., SCA based SOCP scheme), while the outer level problem can be handled by using an 1D search.
Next, we formulate a Stackelberg game for the case when the WET and secure WIT networks belong
to different service suppliers. We formulated the energy trading process between the transmitter and the
PBs as a Stackelberg game, in which the transmitter plays a leader role and pays a price for the energy
services from the PBs to guarantee the required security, and optimizes the energy price and the energy
transfer time to maximize its utility function. Meanwhile, the PBs are modelled as the followers that
determine their optimal transmit powers based on the released energy price to maximize their own utility
function. The Stackelberg equilibrium have been derived in terms of closed-form solution, where both the
transmitter and the PBs come to an agreement on the energy price, transmit power and energy transfer
time. Simulation results have been provided to validate the proposed schemes. For future works, we can
consider a more challenging scenario such that the PBs will not stay silent during the WIT phase but
rather transmit artificial noise to interfere with the eavesdroppers. This would change the dynamic of the
optimization problems and may require different design/solutions.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
When the solution Qs satisfies rank-one conditions in Lemma 1, the SDP relaxed problem (10) can be
equivalently modified as
min
w
‖w‖2,
s.t.
2R¯
σ¯2e
|wHhe,l|2 + (2R¯ − 1) ≤ 1
σ¯2s
|wHhs,k|2, ∀(k, l). (37)
The problem (37) is still not convex in terms of the beamforming vector w. Thus, we propose a novel
reformulation method by applying the following inequality relations in (37),
 a
b

 Kn 0⇔ ‖b‖ ≤ a, (38)
such that (37) can be reformulated into the following SOCP:
min
t,w
t,
s.t.

 t1
w

 KNT+1 0,


1
σ¯s
wHhs,k
2R¯
σ¯e
wHhe,l
(2R¯ − 1) 12

 K3 0, ∀k, ∀l. (39)
Thus, this completes the proof of Theorem 1.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
The power minimization problem (9) with only single legitimate user and eavesdropper can be rewritten
as
min
w
wHw
s.t. log
(
1 +
|hHs w|2
σ¯2s
)
− log
(
1 +
|hHe w|2
σ¯2e
)
≥ R¯. (40)
Now we equivalently modify (40) as
min
v,P
PvHv
s.t.
vH(I+ P
σ¯2s
hsh
H
s )v
vH(I+ P
σ¯2e
hehHe )v
≥ 2R¯, vHv = 1, P ≥ 0. (41)
In order to achieve the optimal solution (P opt,vopt), we consider the Lagrange dual problem to (40), which
can be expressed as
L(w, µ) = wHw + α
[
2R¯
(
1 +
1
σ¯2s
wHheh
H
e w
)
−
(
1 +
1
σ¯2e
wHhsh
H
s w
)]
, (42)
where α ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the secrecy rate constraint. The corresponding
dual problem can be given by
max
α≥0
α(2R¯ − 1), s.t. Y = I− α
(
1
σ¯2s
hsh
H
s −
1
σ¯2e
heh
H
e
)
 0. (43)
The constraint in (43) implies that the matrix Y have at least one zero eigenvalue. On the other hand, the
solution of α can be the maximum value that satisfies the positive semidefinite constraint in (43), which
leads to
αopt =
1
̺max(
1
σ¯2s
hshHs − 2R¯σ¯2e hehHe )
. (44)
The problem (40) can be formulated as a convex optimization problem. Hence, the strong duality holds
between the original problem (40) and the corresponding dual problem (43). The required minimum power
to achieve the secrecy rate constraint is
P opt = αopt(2R¯ − 1). (45)
On the other hand, it is easily verified that the optimal w lies in the null space of Y
w¯ = vmax
(
1
σ¯2s
hsh
H
s −
2R¯
σ¯2e
heh
H
e
)
, vopt =
w¯
‖w¯‖2 . (46)
Hence, the optimal solution to (40) can be expressed as
wopt =
√
P optvopt. (47)
C. Proof of Lemma 3
In order to show that f(θ) is a convex problem, there are two conditions to be satisfied: convex objective
function and convex constraints [40]. First, we rewrite f(θ) as follows:
f(θ) = min
θ
θ(
∑M
m=1 ‖gm‖2)
1− θ ‖w‖
2,
s.t. (1− θ) log
(
1− θ + θts,k
1 − θ + θte,l
)
≥ R¯, 0 < θ < 1, ∀k, ∀l. (48)
It is easily verified that the objective function in (48) is convex with respect to θ. Then, we show that
the secrecy constraint in (48) is convex. Let fk,l(θ) = (1 − θ) log
(
1−θ+θts,k
1−θ+θte,l
)
, where ts,k =
|hH
s,k
w|2
σ2s
and
te,l =
|hH
e,l
w|2
σ2e
. Hence, the remaining part we only show that fk,l(θ) is a concave function with respect to
θ, which can be equivalently written as
fk,l(θ) = (1− θ) log
(
1−θ+θts,k
1−θ
1−θ+θte,l
1−θ
)
= (1− θ) log
(
θ(ts,k−1)+(1−ts,k)+ts,k
1−θ
θ(te,l−1)+(1−te,l)+te,l
1−θ
)
= log
(
(1−ts,k)(1−θ)+ts,k
1−θ
(1−te,l)(1−θ)+te,l
1−θ
)
. (49)
Let z = 1− θ, (0 ≤ θ ≤ 1), fk,l(z) can be rewritten as
fk,l(z) = z log
(1− ts,k)z + ts,k
z
− z log (1− te,l)z + te,l
z
. (50)
Then, we consider the first derivative of fk,l(z),
∂fk,l(z)
z
=
1
ln 2
[(
ln
(1− ts,k)z + ts,k
z
+
−ts,k
(1− ts,k)z + ts,k
)
−
(
ln
(1− te,l)z + te,l
z
+
−te,l
(1− te,l)z + te,l
)]
.
(51)
Furthermore, the second derivative of fk,l(z) is given by
∂2fk,l(z)
z2
=
1
ln 2
[ −t2s,k
[(1− ts,k)z + ts,k]2z −
−t2e,l
[(1− te,l)z + te,l]2z
]
. (52)
Let g(t) = −t
2
[(1−t)z+t]2z
, the first derivative of g(t) is given by
∂g(t)
t
=
−2t[(1− t)z + t] + 2(1− z)t2
[(1− t)z + t]3z =
−2zt
[(1− t)z + t]3z < 0. (53)
It is easily verified that (53) holds since z = 1 − θ ∈ (0, 1), thus, g(t) is a monotonically decreasing
function of t. Due to ts,k > te,l, it is easily obtained that
∂2fk,l(z)
z2
< 0. In other words, fk,l(θ) is a concave
function with respect to θ.
D. Proof of Lemma 4
We first derive the first-order derivatives of (30), which is written as
∂UM (λ)
∂λ
=
1
ln 2
[
µ(1− θ)tsCM
1 + (λCM − 2DM)ts −
µ(1− θ)teCM
1 + (λCM − 2DM)te
]
− 2CMλ+ 2DM . (54)
Then, the second-order derivatives of (30) is given by
∂2UM(λ)
∂2λ
=
1
ln 2
[
µ(1− θ)C2M(t2e − t2s)
[1− (λCM − 2DM)ts]2[1− (λCM − 2DM)te]2
]
− 2CM < 0. (55)
The above inequality holds since ts− te > 0 to guarantee the minimum achievable secrecy rate is greater
than zero. Thus, (30) is a concave function.
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